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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
ETHICS 
Martin H. Redish* 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION. By Philip 
Bobbitt. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1982. 
Pp. xii, 285. $22.95. 
The scholarly debate over the legitimacy of judicial review in a 
democratic society has rapidly expanded over the the past few years, 
rendering any new attempts to contribute to that debate reminiscent 
of a popular song that has remained on the charts too long. The 
most common reaction to both is likely to be, "must we hear this 
again?" Philip Bobbitt's new addition to the already voluminous 
literature, 1 Constitutional Fate, must overcome the reader's natural 
presumption that, by now, little that is original remains to be said on 
the matter. The early parts of the book do not rebut that presump-
tion. While later portions of the book do seem to develop an ap-
proach that is fresh and original in certain respects, the author's 
general failure to place his book within the universe of judicial re-
view scholarship may obscure subtle differences between his ap-
proach and the methods used by scholars who have already 
ploughed the same ground. More important, the mere fact that an 
approach could accurately be characterized as "original" is, of 
course, no guarantee that the analysis is in any way compelling; in-
deed, there may be good reasons why no one has chosen to say the 
same things previously. In Professor Bobbitt's case, these caveats are 
unfortunately all too applicable. 
I. THE TYPOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Bobbitt divides his book into three distinct subunits. Book I deals 
with what he calls "constitutional argument;" Book II concerns 
"constitutional ethics;" and Book III focuses on what Bobbitt labels 
"constitutional expressionism."· Book I's ''typology" represents little 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 
1970, Harvard University. Professor Redish is the author of FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TEN-
SIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980) and FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984) (forthcoming). - Ed. 
I. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); 
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). In addition to being discussed in countless individual articles, the 
subject has also been considered in two significant symposia. See Symposium, 8 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 443 (1983); Symposium, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981). 
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more than a rehash of constitutional arguments already well-known 
to even the most casual professional observer, spiced with gossipy 
anecdotes.2 It is almost as if the section were written for the pre-law 
student eager to learn the mysteries of judicial review: elaborate and 
oversimplified discussions of extremely basic material, with the anec-
dotal examination of personalities included to draw the uninitiated 
reader into the personal mystique of the judicial and academic greats 
of the past fifty years. 
In this portion of the book, Bobbitt describes five basic types of 
constitutional argument: historical, textual, structural, prudential, 
and doctrinal. Before proceeding to discussion of Bobbitt's analysis 
of these somewhat artificially separated forms of argument, one must 
first ask what is the point of the endeavor (assuming, as seems likely, 
the author did not intend the book primarily as a primer for the 
reader unfamiliar with the fundamentals of constitutional analysis). 
While he asserts that his book represents an examination of the 
broad issue of judicial review's legitimacy (p. 3), Bobbitt openly es-
chews "the conventional tack of raising arguments that appear to 
define the scope of legitimate review'' (pp. 5-6). Instead, he chooses 
to begin his work with "a typology of the kinds of arguments one 
finds in judicial opinions, in hearings, and in briefs" (p. 6). I am still 
not sure why he proceeds in this manner. At no point does Bobbitt 
adequately explain why an understanding of this typology is a neces-
sary predicate to an understanding of the validity of judicial review. 
Indeed, an argument could be fashioned that an examination of the 
broad theoretical justifications for judicial review should logically 
precede a detailed analysis of the various modes of constitutional 
argumentation, since one's view of the acceptable justification for ju-
dicial review can substantially color how one views the various argu-
mentative modes. For example, if one rejects the role of the 
unrepresentative judiciary as a developer of values for the 
2. For example, Bobbitt reports that Alexander Bickel ''was short and slight and dressed in 
a dapper, elegant way." P. 61. At another point, Bobbitt notes that in his last conversation 
with him, "Bickel's voice was strong and rapid even though he was largely para,Iyzed and blind 
and was dying that death whose agony is untellable." P. 92. In discussing the theories of 
Professor Henry Hart, Bobbitt reports that at the close of his Holmes Lectures at Harvard, 
Hart "said that his answers were, he now saw, less conclusive than he had hoped. And then, in 
a hushed and crowded Ames courtroom, he sat down." P. 57. In discussing the controversial 
William Crosskey, Bobbitt notes that he ''was by all accounts an unusual, even an eccentric 
man" and recalls Crosskey's "portrait on the walls of the Yale Law Journal office - a balding 
head over a truculent scowl, his large heavy-set frame cra=ed into a small officer's chair. He 
obviously dominated that editorial board as he dominated the photograph." P. 14. Bobbitt 
also relates that "[a]t law school, Crosskey refused to keep notebooks and let it get around that 
he never read cases in preparation for class." P. 14. Unfortunately, this fact in no way distin-
guishes him from a substantial number of my classmates and students. 
In fairness, it should be noted that after all of this frill, Bobbitt engages in a sophisticated, 
perceptive critique of Crosskey's theories. Pp. 15-22. However, this only makes all the more 
puzzling Bobbitt's bizarre decision to detract from his high-level analysis by including so much 
gossip. 
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majoritarian branches of government, one would be more likely to 
invoke what Bobbitt labels either "historical", ''textual", or "pruden-
tial" arguments.3 If, on the other hand, one sees the judiciary's role 
more broadly,4 "ethical" argument would naturally be more attrac-
tive. Since Bobbitt's effort begins with an examination of the various 
modes of argument, however, much of the analysis contains a hollow 
ring, misleadingly conveying the impression that those approaches 
somehow exist divorced from a broader normative theory of judicial 
review. For example, Bobbitt starts his discussion of historical argu-
ment with the disingenuous observation that "one must notice how 
odd it is that the original understanding in any field of study should 
govern present behavior'' (p. 9). If he had first discussed what has 
been generally referred to as the "originalist"5 or "interpretivist"6 
theory of judicial review, it is doubtful he could have so cavalierly 
dismissed the view that our understanding of the Framers' intent 
must be the sole guide for modem judicial review.7 To be sure, I 
agree with Bobbitt's contention that, for various reasons, 8 a strict his-
torical analysis is both inadvisable and unworkable as a measure of 
the legitimacy of judicial review (though the same points have been 
made elsewhere, and, on occasion, considerably more effectively).9 
3. See e.g., Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981). 
4. See generally M. PERRY, supra note 1. 
5. See Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REv. _ (1984) 
(forthcoming). 
6. See generally M. PERRY, supra note 1. I personally believe the term "originalist" more 
accurately describes the position, because one who believes that we are in fact bound by the 
rational limits of constitutional language even though we are not bound by the specific intent 
of those who drafted the provisions might well wish to characterize himself as an "interpre-
tivist," at least if the only alternative label is "non-interpretivist." 
7. This theory is associated with such respected scholars and jurists as Bork, see Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971), Monaghan, see 
Monaghan, supra note 3, and Rehnquist, see Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 
54 TEXAS L. REV. 693 (1976); see also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); 
Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 
1 (1981). · 
8. As Bobbitt correctly puts it: 
We do not have an original commitment to a particular form of historical argument. To 
what source are we to refer for an authoritative understanding? To statements of mem-
bers of the Convention who proposed a particular provision? To the debate surrounding 
its adoption on the convention floor? To earlier language which had been superseded? 
Or should we look, not to the Constitutional Convention, which we must remember was 
not authorized to propose a new constitution, but instead to the various ratifying state 
conventions? 
P. 10. He adds that "[t]he records of the debates are so scanty that full discussion of any point 
has been lost; more importantly, the convention met in secret without official minutes in an 
atmosphere that concealed dissent and put a premium on achieving agreement to a document 
that was unglossed or unexplained in any way that might disclose or provoke fissures in the 
coalitions that proposed it." Pp. 11-12. 
A number of years ago, I raised similar arguments. See Redish, Seventh Amendment Right 
to Jury Trial· A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decisionmaking, 10 Nw. U. L. REv 486, 
510-11 (1975). 
9. See, e.g., Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Demo-
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But by examioioe the originalist position solely as a part of an analy-
sis of strategic argumentation, his discussion is inherently limited in 
its scope, and thus fails to examine in sufficient detail the justifica-
tions that respected commentators have advanced in defense of the 
originalist approach. 10 
The other forms of constitutional argument cited by Bobbitt are 
"textual," "structural," "prudential," and "doctrinal." I suppose it is 
true that, in one sense or another, each of these elements enters into 
constitutional argument, but to draw formal distinctions among 
them creates a certain degree of misleading artificiality by imposing 
rigid lines of demarcation that do not necessarily exist in reality. For 
example, "doctrinal" argument simply refers to "neutral principles 
of general application to a legal, rather than political, context" (p. 
42).11 But there is no logical reason why those "neutral principles of 
general application" cannot themselves be derived either from his-
torical understanding, a structural approach, an ethical analysis, or 
textual construction.12 
Problems beyond the imposition of artificial lines of demarcation 
plague the analysis contained in Book I. Even if we were to accept 
the validity of Bobbitt's categorizations, his individual examination 
of each of his categories leaves something to be desired. While he 
purports to analyze textual argument in Book I, he never considers 
the validity of the view that textual limits should bind the judiciary 
in engaging in judicial review, 13 nor does he adequately consider the 
troubling questions raised by an attempt to divorce_ constitutional 
cratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1049, 1071-73, 1090-92 (1979); Bice, Rationality Analysis in 
Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. I, 26-33 (1980); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for 1/1e 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 214-15 (1980). 
10. Bobbitt does assert that "[t]here is a legal grammar that we all share and that we have 
all mastered prior to our being able to ask what the reasons are for a court having power to 
review legislation." P. 6. However, at no point in the book does he adequately make this 
important connection, save perhaps when he uses the last form of constitutional argument -
his "ethical" variety - as a lead-in to his broader discussion of constitutional ethical analysis 
in Book II. See text following note 19 infra. Most of the other forms of constitutional argu-
ment which he describes, however, are largely left hanging. 
11. Bobbitt takes an inordinately long time in his discussion of doctrinal argument before 
providing us with this important description. See pp. 39-42. 
12. At one point, Bobbitt asserts that "(o]ne corollary of the textual approach is a disregard 
of precedent." P. 33. I fail to understand why that is necessarily so: why could not a court 
deem itself bound by precedent interpreting text? In National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater 
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), a divided majority of the Court (a plurality of three and 
four dissenters) concluded that it was bound by Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Hepburn & 
Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 226, 2 Cranch 445 (1805), interpreting the word "States" in the diver-
sity clause of article Ill, section 2 of the Constitution so as not to include the District of Colum-
bia, leading to the conclusion that suits between citizens of the District and those of a state did 
not fall within the federal judiciary's diversity jurisdiction. 
13. In a sense, Book II deals primarily with this question, though only indirectly, and never 
in a way that adequately ties the earlier discussion to this subsequent analysis. This is a ques-
tion to which Professor Perry has devoted an extensive analysis. See generally M. PERRY, 
supra note I. 
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language from the understanding of those who drafted it, or the phil-
osophical and linguistic issues raised by the inherent indeterminacy 
of language.14 In his discussion of so-called "structural" argument, 
he describes, with what I consider an insufficiently critical eye, the 
theory that constitutional precepts may be derived from some un-
stated "structural" principles that law professors can somehow deci-
pher without any real basing in text. 15 Bobbitt acknowledges that 
"[s]tructural arguments are sometimes accused of being indetermi-
nate because while we can all agree on the presence of the various 
structures, we fall to bickering when called upon to decide whether a 
particular result is necessarily inf erred from their relationships" (p. 
84). Yet having raised the problem, he deals with it in only the most 
conclusory and superficial manner. 16 Simply put, expansive use of 
these so-called "structural" arguments, untied to specific constitu-
tional language, invites total resort to modem political judgments as 
a substitute for constitutional analysis. Bobbitt never adequately 
comes to grips with this fundamental issue.17 
By the time one finishes Bobbitt's discussion of structural argu-
ment, one remains unsure of the author's point in all this. One con-
tinues to ask, is his purpose simply to describe modes of strategic 
argumentation, or is it to propose - as have scholars of such renown 
as Ely18 and Perry19 before him - an overriding, coherent analysis 
of judicial review theory? The uncertainty largely stems from Bob-
bitt's commission of the cardinal sin of failing to provide at the out-
set a clear road map of where he intends to take us. But his 
discussion of the final form of constitutional argumentation - the 
"ethical" variety - sets the groundwork for what is by far the most 
stimulating and sophisticated portion of Bobbitt's work - Book II. 
"By ethical argument," Bobbitt writes, "I mean constitutional argu-
ment whose force relies on a characterization of American institu-
tions and the role within them of the American people. It is the 
character, or ethos, of the American polity that is advanced in ethical 
14. See, e.g., Schauer,An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982). 
15. Bobbitt asserts "that the structural approach, unlike much doctrinalism, is grounded in 
the actual text of the Constitution. But, unlike textualist arguments, the passages that are sig-
nificant are not those of express grants of power or particular prohibitions but instead those 
which, by setting up structures of a certain kind, permit us to draw the requirements of the 
relationships among structures." P. 80. In effect, I suppose, this means that the "structuralist" 
latches on to several key words or phrases and gives them a meaning well beyond normal 
linguistic limitations. 
16. "Indeed one good reason for adopting structural approaches is that they are more satis-
fying, being truer approximations of the interaction of actual reasons yielding actual results 
than are doctrinal or textual approaches. We share a constitutional sense and we use it." P. 85 
(emphasis in original). 
17. See p. 89. 
18. See generally J. ELY, supra note I. 
19. See generally M. PERRY, supra note I. 
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argument as the source from which particular decisions derive" (p. 
94, emphasis in original).20 But making ethical arguments is often a 
dangerous enterprise; one is often tempted to reject another's ap-
proach on the ground that it does not truly engage in ethical argu-
ment, when in reality it simply employs an ethical structure different 
from one's own. Bobbitt seems to fall into this trap, thus underscor-
ing - albeit perhaps unwittingly - the dangers in employing an 
ethical approach to constitutional interpretation. 
The problem can be discerned when Bobbitt contrasts the 
Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,21 strik-
ing down an Ohio zoning ordinance that limited occupancy of a 
dwelling unit to members of a single, narrowly-defined "family" as it 
was applied to a woman who lived with her son's nephew, with its 
earlier decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas22 upholding a zon-
ing ordinance that prevented more than two unrelated persons from 
living together. In Moore, Justice Powell, speaking for the plurality, 
relied upon the value of extended kinship23 - what Bobbitt refers to 
as "a clear and . . . persuasive exposition of an ethical argument" 
(p. 97). On this basis, Bobbitt sees an easy and obvious distinction 
between this case and the earlier decision in Belle Terre, which of 
course did not involve family relationships, either immediate or ex-
tended. While this is of course a tenable rationalization of the two 
cases, Bobbitt criticizes Professor Tribe's attempt to distinguish the 
two on the ground that Belle Terre did not involve an "enduring 
relationship" while Moore did.24 He labels Tribe's rationalization of 
the two decisions "extraordinary doctrinal pyrotechnics" and sug-
gests that it is "because he has elected a different constitutional ap-
proach than that taken by the Court that so able a reader as 
Professor Tribe is led to so profound a misconstruction" (p. 97). 
Tribe may well have misread the Court's distinction between the two 
cases, but why does it follow that he has "elected a different constitu-
tional approach"? Presumably Bobbitt means that Tribe is employ-
ing doctrinal argument, while the Court is using ethical argument. 
This points up again the artificial nature of Bobbitt's typology -
why is Tribe's principle (valuing "enduring relationships") any more 
"doctrinal" or less "ethical" than Bobbitt's (valuing "extended" fam-
ily relationships)? Bobbitt contends that "[t]here is nothing clearly 
discernible in the American ethos that relies on the value of endur-
20. Bobbitt notes that "ethical arguments are not moral arguments. Ethical constitutional 
arguments do not claim that a particular solution is right or wrong in any sense larger than 
that the solution comports with the sort of people we are and the means we have chosen to 
solve political and customary constitutional problems." Pp. 94-95 (emphasis in original). 
21. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
22. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
23. 431 U.S. at 504-06. 
24. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 990 (1978). 
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ing relationships generally, except possibly magazine subscriptions 
and appeals from one's old college" (p. 97), but at best this estab-
lishes only that Tribe's ethical principle is incorrect, not that it is not 
an ethical principle at all. At worst, the point simply underscores the 
highly subjective nature of most of these ethical judgments. For I, at 
least, would not be so willing to dismiss Tribe's asserted principle as 
necessarily any less ethically valid than Bobbitt's. But with all its 
problems, Bobbitt's discussion of ethical argument at least paves the 
way for the more challenging and controversial analysis that follows. 
For it is in the book's next section that he comes closest to putting 
forward a coherent, rationalized theory of an expansive form of judi-
cial review, under which the courts may test the constitutionality of 
legislation by ethically-derived principles not explicitly embodied in 
constitutional text. 
JI. JUSTIFYING THE USE OF ETHICAL ARGUMENTS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The most dubious aspect of Bobbitt's broad discussion of "Con-
stitutional Ethics" is his contention that he is somehow breaking im-
portant new ground in constitutional thinking by even suggesting 
that ethical arguments are important, and, indeed, even controlling, 
in constitutional analysis. This approach, he asserts, "has not been 
well-defined by scholars" (p. 125), though he puzzlingly makes not a 
single reference to the far more sophisticated discussion of similar 
questions in Michael Perry's work.25 He suggests that "[b]ecause of 
the wariness with which ethical approaches are treated . . . it is not 
easy to find direct evidence of their use in constitutional law" (p. 
125), though one would be hard pressed to describe such well-known 
decisions as Griswold v. Connecticut26 and Roe v. Wade21 in any 
other manner. Nevertheless, Bobbitt ultimately puts forth an inter-
esting - if seriously flawed - attempt to rationalize the Supreme 
Court's use of ethical principles in its constitutional decisions. 
The most obvious questions about the use of purely ethical anal-
ysis in judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution are (1) from 
where does the judiciary derive authority to interpose ethical princi-
ples not found directly in the text and/ or history of the Constitution 
into its decisions purporting to interpret the Constitution, and (2) 
assuming use of such an ethical analysis is deemed legitimate, how is 
the Court to derive these ethical principles? While Bobbitt's answer 
to the second inquiry is disappointingly disingenuous (as illustrated 
by his discussion of Tribe's position on Belle Terre),28 his answer to 
25. See generally M. Perry, supra note I. 
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
28. See text at notes 21-24supra. 
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the first represents the high point of what is generally a disap-
pointing book. 
Bobbitt's explanation of why the Court may incorporate ethical 
argument into its decisionmaking is a ninth amendment-like analysis 
that emphasizes the inherently limited nature of federal governmen-
tal power. The point, in other words, is that the Bill of Rights does 
not exhaust the list of constitutionally protected liberties; in Bobbitt's 
words, "one way we may understand the Bill of Rights is as a collec-
tion of those examples of power denied the federal government 
which simply happened to occur to Madison and others as requiring 
reinforcement, perhaps on account of the historical experience with 
respect to unlimited government" (p. 146). This is because "[g]iven 
the limited nature of the government that the body of the Constitu-
tion describes, the retained rights of persons . . . would necessarily 
constitute an infinite list. Both the unspecified rights and the enu-
merated prohibitions derive from the general constitutional ground 
of enumerated and implied powers" (p. 144). 
He is of course correct in asserting that "[t]he Constitution estab-
lishes a government of limited powers. Those means not fairly im-
plied from affirmative grants of authority are inferentially denied the 
government" (p. 144). This is what Dean Ely has called the "check-
list" approach to constitutional construction:29 Any federal legisla-
tion not authorized by one of Congress' enumerated powers in 
article I,30 read in conjunction with the necessary and proper 
clause,31 is unconstitutional, not because it invades some separate 
constitutionally-defined enclave, but simply because Congress lacks 
power to legislate in a way not authorized by the Constitution. Bob-
bitt seems to imply that if we characterize our interposition of ethical 
principles as merely a finding that the legislation in question is unau-
thorized by the constitutional grant of power, we are freed from any 
need to confine our ethical principles to those described in the text of 
the Bill of Rights: "The Constitution - indeed the body of the Con-
stitution standing unamended - need not declare these prohibitions 
because the affirmative power to accomplish such acts does not ex-
ist" (p. 145).32 
As intriguing as this analysis may at first seem, its fatal defects 
29. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 701 (1974). 
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
31. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 18. 
32. Bobbitt su=arizes his position when he writes: 
Constitutional ethical argument cannot be generated solely by analogies to the Bill of 
Rights. To do so would be to treat the Bill of Rights as the generative constitutional 
mechanism (a role it does have, of course, with respect to doctrine) and would ignore the 
fact that it has no greater claim as a limit on power than have all the other rights that can 
also be generated by the ethos of limited government. 
Pp. 146-47 (footnote omitted). 
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rapidly become noticeable. One significant difficulty is that the con-
cept of a government of limited powers contained in the Constitution 
is inherently confined to actions of the federal government. In struc-
turing the Constitution, the Framers in no way attempted to under-
mine the assumption that state governments were repositories of 
general governmental authority. Indeed, their care in emphasizing 
the limited nature of federal power only serves to highlight their un-
derstanding of the generally33 unlimited nature of state authority. 
Thus, even if Bobbitt were correct in all of his reasoning described to 
this point, at most it would seem to authorize the use of ethical prin-
ciples solely as a constraint on federal power. 
Bobbitt recognizes the problem, and attempts to deal with it: 
With respect to the states, who are not creatures of limited, delegated 
purposes, one may say as a general matter that those means denied the 
federal government are also limitations of the states, by virtue of the 
integration of federal constituti01;1al norms into the contours of state 
authority produced by the Civil War. That is to say that states, in the 
pursuit of their quite different ends, are denied those means which are 
not necessary and proper to the achievement of federal ends. [Pp. 150-
51]. 
Bobbitt thus has developed what he calls a "photo-negative para-
digm" (p. 151) for measuring state authority to contravene ethical 
principles. Relying on the privileges and immunities clause of the 
fourteenth amendment34 as "textual support" for his approach, Bob-
bitt suggests that "[w]e need only ask: is this legislative means 
(whether federal or state) one that is fairly inferable from one of the 
federal enumerated powers?" (p. 152). In so doing, he in effect at-
tempts to place a square peg in a round hole. There is no basis on 
which to believe that either the Civil War itself or the post-Civil War 
amendments so radically restructured our federal system as to trans-
form the state governmental powers into a carbon copy of enumer-
ated federal governmental powers. At most, those amendments 
established new constitutional enclaves to protect citizens from 
otherwise unlimited state power; there is no historical or philosophi-
cal basis - and Bobbitt does not attempt to provide one - on which 
to transform these amendments into the establishment of federal-
like checklists for state authority. 
More importantly, as a purely practical matter it would be ab-
surd to suggest that the states can do no more or less than can the 
federal government. A state can, it is traditionally assumed, regulate 
33. There were, in fact, a few direct limits on state power placed in the body of the Consti-
tution. The primary example is the contract clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § IO, cl. l. The pri-
mary limitation on state power embodied in the Constitution is, however, in the supremacy 
clause, art. VI, cl. 2. Even the Bill of Rights, it should be recalled, had no applicability to the 
states. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
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intrastate commerce. If we superimpose the federal checklist on the 
scope of state power, does it now follow that a state can only regulate 
interstate commerce, as can the federal government? Does it now 
mean that the federal government cannot preempt state action, be-
cause their powers, being identical, are forever in stalemate? Does it 
mean that a state can raise armies? Bobbitt himself recognizes the 
absurd possibilities. He therefore acknowledges that "in applying 
the ethical approach against state action we may not limit the in-
ferred means merely to a restatement of the federal end, since the 
ends of state power are by definition largely different from those of 
national government and such a limitation would amount to the im-
position of a test for federal ends ... " (p. 155). Instead, Bobbitt, 
using as an example a state statute making robbery a criminal of-
fense, suggests that 
we may ask whether, at least on the basis of ethical approaches, a state 
statute making robbery a criminal offense is constitutional by looking 
at the specific method used - the trial of the offender and his impris-
onment for stealing another's possessions - that does not embody a 
federal objective. We may then test this means against a similar fed-
eral means for constitutionality - for example, the federal bank rob-
bery statutes. [P. 155]. 
He seems to be saying that we can discern whether a state statute is a 
proper means to attain an authorized end by seeking analogies in the 
federal system. But even if such an approach were workable, it still 
highlights the awkwardness of testing state authority by means of 
limitations established solely for the purpose of testing federal 
power. Often, however, drawing such analogies will be a most diffi-
cult task. For the simple fact is that state governments may deal 
with day-to-day matters of governing of a type for which the federal 
government just was not designed. 
There is, however, an even more difficult problem with Bobbitt's 
assertion that ethically-derived freedoms not found explicitly in con-
stitutional text may be inf erred to have constitutional status from the 
absence of direct constitutional authorization of the government to 
invade those freedoms. The inquiry into whether the government 
has been granted authority to take certain action is, by its nature, a 
non-ethical process. In other words, in undertaking such an inquiry, 
the Court is not in a position to question whether Congress should 
have been given the authority to collect taxes or regulate interstate 
commerce or raise armies or conduct wars or protect patents; the 
Court necessarily takes these as a given. Therefore, in deciding 
whether governmental action is authorized by the enumerated pow-
ers, the Court is not undertaking an ethical inquiry into that action; 
rather, it is simply deciding whether the action somehow reasonably 
furthers the goals of the particular constitutional grant of power -
in other words, whether the action is truly "necessary and proper" to 
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the exercise of that enumerated power. To be sure, the Court may 
scrutinize the governmental action with extreme care, as was once 
done,35 or it may provide the majoritarian branches of government 
with considerable flexibility in deciding for themselves what is in 
fact necessary and proper, as is generally the modern practice.36 But 
in neither event is the Court really called upon to examine the ethi-
cal implications of the government action in question. The point, in 
other words, is that the checklist limitation on federal power is by its 
nature concerned solely with whether or not legislation can ration-
ally be deemed to further one or more of the powers delegated to the 
government; if in doing so the law may be thought to violate some 
ethical principle, that fact is not a matter of concern under the check-
list analysis. It becomes so only if the law - though authorized by 
the delegation of enumerated powers - simultaneously invades a 
separate constitutionally established enclave. 
For example, if Congress were to enact a statute providing that 
no one may criticize our military activities in Lebanon or Grenada, 
the checklist analysis would ask only whether the law furthers (j.e., is 
"necessary and proper" to) the exercise of Congress' enumerated war 
powers under article 1.37 In fact, a strong argument could be made 
that the law does just that, because Congress could rationally con-
clude that widespread criticism could undermine the morale of our 
soldiers and give our enemies encouragement in their hopes that 
public pressures will force our government to withdraw our troops. 
However, there can be little doubt that the law also violates the en-
clave established in the first amendment protection of freedom of 
expression. To the extent that the interest in protecting individual 
rights is implicated in judicial review, then, it is not as a result of the 
comparison between the legislation in question and the list of enu-
merated powers. Bobbitt's inquiry focuses exclusively on the ration-
ality of the means-ends connection. This is simply an inquiry into 
efficiency, not ethics. 
Bobbitt apparently fails to see this fundamental distinction in the 
mechanisms of judicial review. For example, as part of his "absence 
of authority" analysis, Bobbitt attempts to restructure the rationale 
for the decision in Roe v. Wade, 38 recognizing a constitutionally pro-
tected right to an abortion. He begins his analysis with the following 
ethical principle: "Government may not coerce intimate acts" (p. 
159). On the basis of this constitutional/ethical principle, Bobbitt 
reasons that "[w]hatever else may be an intimate act, carrying a child 
within one's body and giving birth must be a profoundly intimate 
35. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
36. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, els. 11. 12, 13. 
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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act" (p. 160). He acknowledges that arguably "a woman who volun-
tarily consents not merely to sexual intercourse . . . but also to car-
rying a child for a period long enough so that she can both be 
presumed to be aware of her condition and to have had the time to 
reflect on it, has by her acquiescence waived any claim against the 
state's coercion" (p. 161). He concludes, however, that "[b]ecause 
the mode in which the Roe argument I have given is ethical . . . it 
cannot yield to waiver .... No 'waiver' on the part of a woman can 
augment the government's authority. Indeed, she has such a right 
because government has no power to begin with" (p. 162). I fail to 
understand a logic that asserts that because a principle is ethical, it is 
not subject to waiver. Perhaps that conclusion is self-evident to Bob-
bitt; it certainly is not to me. The more important questions about 
Bobbitt's rewriting of Roe, however, concern both the validity of his 
ethical principles and his assumption that his ethical principle is 
transformed into a constitutional rule ( despite the absence of any ex-
plicit textual reference) by means of his "absence-of-delegated-au-
thority" analysis. 
Bobbitt attempts to establish the moral validity of his principle 
inductively by pointing to concrete illustrations of governmental ac-
tions that violate his ethical directive, and then assuming our moral 
repulsion to those actions. He rhetorically asks, "[d]oes anyone 
reading this page even entertain the possibility that the state might 
be able to order errant husbands or wives to rejoin the families they 
have abandoned?" (p. 160). I guess I had not really thought about 
the question before, but I must say the answer does not seem as clear 
to me as it apparently does to Bobbitt. That fact once again under-
scores the never-adequately-answered question of exactly how we 
discern what principles are ethical and what are not. But the more 
important question for present purposes, assuming the validity of 
Bobbitt's ethical assertion, is where - if anywhere - in the Consti-
tution is such activity on the part of the state prohibited? 
Bobbitt initially assumes that such governmental action is pro-
hibited somewhere in the Constitution: "The barriers must be consti-
tutional, it would seem, to account for our sense of absolute 
prohibition" (p. 160). For the moment, I will disregard this logical 
non sequitur. For Bobbitt's most significant error is his assumption 
that it is an "absence-of-authority" - or checklist - analysis that 
gives us this answer. Since it is at least conceivable that compulsion 
of an intimate act might be rationally thought to further one or more 
of the federal government's enumerated powers, it is difficult to see 
how a constitutional rule prohibiting governmental compulsion of 
intimate acts derives from the lack of a grant of authority to do so. 
For example, assume that Congress has enacted a statute that 
provides that in order to improve the morale of soldiers in battle, 
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civilians of the opposite sex are required to have sexual relations 
with soldiers who are about to be transferred to battle.39 Can it be 
doubted that such legislation - though it clearly compels the per-
formance of an intimate act - rationally furthers the performance 
of Congress' war powers under article I? A court might have diffi-
culty questioning the congressional conclusion that (1) a soldier's 
morale is directly relevant to his or her success in battle, and (2) 
governmental provision of members of the opposite sex for sexual 
relations will likely raise a soldier's morale. 
This does not mean that I necessarily believe such a statute either 
would or should be held constitutional. True, as morally monstrous 
as the law seems to be, there appears to be no specific enclave in the 
Bill of Rights that prohibits it. But the important issues for constitu-
tional analysis would be (1) do either the fifth amendment's protec-
tion of "liberty" or some "penumbra" derived from an amalgam of 
various amendments40 provide an enclave against such action, and 
(2) if not, is the Supreme Court empowered to find such an enclave 
as a matter of its power of "non-interpretive" review, perhaps sub-
ject to reversal by Congress through use of its power under the Ex-
ceptions Clause of article Ill.41 John Ely, I think, would answer 
"no" to both questions. His theory, in his own words, "is one that 
bounds judicial review under the Constitution's open-ended provi-
sions by insisting that it can appropriately concern itself only with 
questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the 
political choice under attack."42 He responds to the parade of statu-
tory horribles that every imaginative mind could create (a list that 
would quite comfortably accommodate my rather extreme hypothet-
ical) by asserting, simply, that "that law couldn't conceivably 
pass."43 Michael Perry, I believe, would probably answer the first 
question in the negative, but would just as likely answer the second 
question in the affirmative.44 
But Bobbitt does not concern himself with these matters or with 
what leading theorists would say about them. Indeed, his virtually 
uniform failure to discuss the views of other theorists and contrast 
39. The hypothetical statute is purposely made sexually neutral, in order to avoid problems 
of discrimination against women. Thus, the statute would equally require male civilians to 
have sexual relations with female members of the armed forces as it would female civilians to • 
have sex with male soldiers. 
40. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 provides that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction 
is given ''with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." See 
generally Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under 
the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982). 
42. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 181. 
43. Id at 182. 
44. See M. PERRY, supra note 1 at 91-145. 
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them with his own45 is a significant structural defect in the book. 
Instead, he attempts to circumvent all of the important issues con-
cerning the legitimacy of an unrepresentative court's invalidation of 
an ethically repulsive statute enacted by an electorally-accountable 
legislature when the ethical principle violated is neither expressly 
nor implicitly embodied in a constitutional enclave. He does this by 
assuming that the Framers either would not nor could not have cho-
sen to delegate to Congress the authority to violate an ethical princi-
ple. But when the dust settles, all Bobbitt has done is to create 
constitutional enclaves to protect ethical principles when no such en-
clave exists. This may or may not be a valid conclusion but if it is 
valid, it is certainly not because the Court is properly performing its 
traditionally-accepted function of ascertaining whether particular 
legislation actually falls within the federal government's enumerated 
powers. It would simply be because we have decided to allow the 
Court to act as a moralizing force, perhaps, as Perry would argue, for 
the very reason that it is in fact unrepresentative.46 But such a view 
is an extremely controversial one in a democratic society, for obvious 
reasons. Thus, Bobbitt's attempt to avoid this difficulty of demo-
cratic theory by transforming the infusion of ethical principles into a 
form of traditional judicial review ultimately fails. 
III. CONCLUSION 
I have chosen not to discuss in detail the substance of Bobbitt's 
"Book III," in which he purports to examine "some of the functions 
of judicial review" (p. 181 ). The section contains some interesting 
insights concerning the Court's role in "expressing" important con-
stitutional values, even where it cannot or will not command their 
enforcement.47 Ultimately, however, this section also fails, in part 
because of defective analysis of the rationales in specific cases48 and 
4S. Michael Perry's name never appears in the book. John Ely is referred to briefly in two 
places, pp. 231, 238. Paul Brest is given one brief reference, p. 231, and the same is true of 
Ronald Dworkin, p. 23. 
46. See M. PERRY, supra note I, at 100: 
Our electorally accountable policymaking institutions are not well suited to deal with such 
issues in a way that is faithful to the notion of moral evolution or, therefore, to our reli-
gious understanding of ourselves. . . . 
Executive and especially legislative officials tend to deal with fundamental political-
moral problems, at least highly controversial ones, by reflexive reference to the estab-
lished moral conventions of the greater part of their constituencies. 
47. See pp. 196-219. 
48. Most troubling in this regard is Bobbitt's unperceptive discussion of the opinions in 
School Dist. of Abbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), holding the required 
reading of the Bible in public schools to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion. He 
attacks the decision for employing a "doctrinal" approach, one that "itself is inadequate to 
decide this case." P. 208. That is because both the majority and the dissent rely on a so-called 
"neutral" doctrinal principle, and "relying on the principle each asserts provides us with no 
way to choose between them." P. 208. What Bobbitt fails to recognize, however, is that one 
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in part because - as is true of much of the book - Bobbitt never 
adequately provides an underlying structure that ties his assertions 
to the other portions of his analysis to form a coherent theory of 
judicial review. 
The last two portions of the book demonstrate that Bobbitt is 
capable of sophisticated legal and theoretical analysis, whatever the 
merits of that analysis. He is a scholar with many years ahead in 
which to refine and develop his capabilities, and he has demon-
strated enough to make me believe it possible that his later work will 
make significant contributions to the already rich constitutional liter-
ature. However, scholarship on the subject of judicial review is al-
ready substantial, and while it may at some point benefit from future 
contributions - perhaps by Bobbitt himself - his Constitutional 
Fate fails to further significantly the level of inquiry. 
"neutral principle" or "doctrine" may make more sense than another, in terms oflogic, consti-
tutional language, and societal values. 
Equally important in Bobbitt's discussion of Schempp is the continued evidence of his poor 
organizational structure. The case discussion begins his chapter entitled "Expressive Func-
tion." However, through the first thirteen pages of his analysis, he emphasizes- to the virtual 
exclusion of all else - the weaknesses in the use of doctrinal argument, as demonstrated in 
Schempp. Yet that was his subject some eleven chapters earlier. It is not until he completes 
his extended, substantively dubious analysis of the use of doctrinal argument that he even 
raises the role of the decision as an illustration of the Court's so-called "expressive function." 
By the eleventh page of the chapter, I was saying to myself, "for heaven's sake, what is the 
point of all this?" 
